A Fast Eavesdropping Attack Against Touchscreens

@InProceedings{	  maggi_iclearshot_2011,
  abstract	= {The pervasiveness of mobile devices increases the risk of
		  exposing sensitive information on the go. In this paper, we
		  arise this concern by presenting an automatic attack
		  against modern touchscreen keyboards. We demonstrate the
		  attack against the Apple iPhone 2010's most popular
		  touchscreen device although it can be adapted to other
		  devices (e.g., Android) that employ similar key-magnifying
		  keyboards. Our attack processes the stream of frames from a
		  video camera (e.g., surveillance or portable camera) and
		  recognizes keystrokes online, in a fraction of the time
		  needed to perform the same task by direct observation or
		  offline analysis of a recorded video, which can be
		  unfeasible for large amount of data. Our attack detects,
		  tracks, and rectifies the target touchscreen, thus
		  following the device or camera's movements and eliminating
		  possible perspective distortions and rotations In
		  real-world settings, our attack can automatically recognize
		  up to 97.07 percent of the keystrokes (91.03 on average),
		  with 1.15 percent of errors (3.16 on average) at a speed
		  ranging from 37 to 51 keystrokes per minute.},
  author	= {Maggi, Federico and Volpatto, Alberto and Gasparini,
		  Simone and Boracchi, Giacomo and Zanero, Stefano},
  booktitle	= {Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on
		  Information Assurance and Security (IAS)},
  date		= {2011-12-05},
  doi		= {10.1109/ISIAS.2011.6122840},
  file		= {files/papers/conference-papers/maggi_iclearshot_2011.pdf},
  isbn		= {978-1-4577-2154-0},
  pages		= {320--325},
  shorttitle	= {iClearshot},
  title		= {A Fast Eavesdropping Attack Against Touchscreens}
}