Don't touch a word! A practical input eavesdropping attack against mobile touchscreen devices
Authors:Federico Maggi, Alberto Volpatto, Simone Gasparini, Giacomo Boracchi, Stefano Zanero
Politecnico di Milano
Technical Report
Abstract
Spying on a person is a subtle, yet easy and reliable method to obtain sensitive information. Even if the victim is well protected from digital attacks, spying may be a viable option. In addition, the pervasiveness of mobile devices increases an attacker's opportunities to observe the victims while they are accessing or entering sensitive information. This risk is exacerbated by the remarkable user-friendliness of modern, mobile graphical interfaces, which, for example, display visual feedback to improve the user experience and make common tasks, $ensuremathbackslashbackslash$eg, typing, more natural. Unfortunately, this turns into the well-known trade-off between usability and security. In this work, we focus on how usability of modern mobile interfaces may affect the users' privacy. In particular, we describe a practical eavesdropping attack, able to recognize the sequence of keystrokes from a low-resolution video, recorded while the victim is typing on a touchscreen. Our attack exploits the fact that modern virtual keyboards, as opposed to mechanical ones, often display magnified, virtual keys in predictable positions. To demonstrate the feasibility of this attack we implemented it against 2010's most popular smart-phone (i.e., Apple's iPhone). Our approach works under realistic conditions, because it tracks and rectifies the target screen according to the victim's natural movements, before performing the keystroke recognition. On real-world settings, our attack can automatically recognize up to 97.07% (91.03% on average) of the keystrokes, with a 1.15% error rate and a speed between 37 and 51 keystrokes per minute. This work confirms that touchscreen keyboards that magnify keys make automatic eavesdropping attacks easier than in classic mobile keyboards.
@TechReport{ maggi_iclearshot_tr_2010,
abstract = {Spying on a person is a subtle, yet easy and reliable
method to obtain sensitive information. Even if the victim
is well protected from digital attacks, spying may be a
viable option. In addition, the pervasiveness of mobile
devices increases an attacker's opportunities to observe
the victims while they are accessing or entering sensitive
information. This risk is exacerbated by the remarkable
user-friendliness of modern, mobile graphical interfaces,
which, for example, display visual feedback to improve the
user experience and make common tasks,
\$\ensuremath\backslashbackslash\$eg, typing, more natural.
Unfortunately, this turns into the well-known trade-off
between usability and security. In this work, we focus on
how usability of modern mobile interfaces may affect the
users' privacy. In particular, we describe a practical
eavesdropping attack, able to recognize the sequence of
keystrokes from a low-resolution video, recorded while the
victim is typing on a touchscreen. Our attack exploits the
fact that modern virtual keyboards, as opposed to
mechanical ones, often display magnified, virtual keys in
predictable positions. To demonstrate the feasibility of
this attack we implemented it against 2010's most popular
smart-phone (i.e., Apple's iPhone). Our approach works
under realistic conditions, because it tracks and rectifies
the target screen according to the victim's natural
movements, before performing the keystroke recognition. On
real-world settings, our attack can automatically recognize
up to 97.07% (91.03% on average) of the keystrokes, with a
1.15% error rate and a speed between 37 and 51 keystrokes
per minute. This work confirms that touchscreen keyboards
that magnify keys make automatic eavesdropping attacks
easier than in classic mobile keyboards.},
author = {Maggi, Federico and Volpatto, Alberto and Gasparini,
Simone and Boracchi, Giacomo and Zanero, Stefano},
date = {2010-11-01},
file = {files/papers/reports/maggi_iclearshot_tr_2010.pdf},
institution = {Politecnico di Milano},
number = {2010-59},
shorttitle = {iClearshot},
title = {Don't touch a word! A practical input eavesdropping attack
against mobile touchscreen devices}}